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Abst ract
Today. moSI firms provide equity-based Ineenllve eomlXn.a1lon to thcn non-execut,,'e direc tors,
We summarize viewpoints support,,'e and critical of thrs development. We argue thaI the
effect iwness of incent;ve compcnSJllOn IS relaled to the struClure of the mcenllve pay contact.
We doscuss!he usc of op tions and shares as well as the Issue ofwhether mcem",'c pay sho uld be
~eared towa rd "UTTen l rewards or future Lt\C entlve.' , We also d,scms the cnllcat ISSUe of
mamtalnlng lhe ownershIp exposure of direc tors by providmg suffiCIent levels of equ;ty as wcl l
as placing restnelions on cashing out. Using OUT argun'lems above, we suggest glllde line' for
c(lnSlrucling an opllmal eonlract. lVe c"mpare 289 ", cenl i"C plans offered by p ublic compames
m the US dunng 1988-1998 ami find that plans ucv late Slgm ti cantly from the opllmum,
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T he Design of Incent ive Co mpe nsa tion for Director s
In 1989. the board of General Eleemc Corponlllon (GE) voted to ofTer stock opllons to us non-
execunve directors (hereafler, simply dLfcetors) . For the first llme, GE d,rectors would have
their annual compe nsatio[\ directly tied to their <hareholders' fortunes. Dlrecto" were glYC." an
annUllI option grant of up to 1,500 shares wIth an exerelse price equal to the prevailing share
pflce. The opllons were exercisable m four cqual annual msrallmcnts and cxplred In 10 years.
Interestingly. the annual option grant was designed as an addition to an already competitive
compensation package eomaLn,ng an annual reta iner of$25,000 Jnd a fcc of$I ,200 per m~'<:tmg,
GE waS in thc van~uard of the move to offer stock options to d"""tors. In a 1992
Conference Board survey of large eorpora!Lons III the UnLlcd Slates, only 45% of the companlcs
sun..,yed reponed 10 have tncluded some slocks m almua! compensation for dllc"'lors, In
contrast, m a SI milar sun'ey in 1997, more than 80% of the firm. offered SOmC form of equity ·
based compen sation to their d lfeClolO , What is k hmd this phcnomt."on? Why are so many US
finn s jumping on this bandwagon'! Whatissues should finns consider when offenng mcenll\'<
pay to their directors'!
Our paper has the following obJeclL,,"s. We summJnze the preVJ llmg arguments and
anecdotal evidence on director incemlve pay using both academic and bu,mcss sources, Wl' thcn
ldentify practical implementatIon ISsues concernmg the destgn of dirl'<:tor Ineentlvc
compensalion arrangcments and provide evidence on the current stale of such practices by
repomng on 289 plans adopted by US firms dunng the period 1988· 1998.
Why Usc Incco tiw Comp en ,at ion for Non-£ ,~",' u t i "e Olrectors?
We define d,rector Lncentive compensation as the u", of stocks, stock option" and other
equity-based comperlsalion as all imegral pan of thc direclor's compensa tion package . Pro" iding
finatJqal Incentives 10 dtreCiOO can encourage dr5lfable behavior such as active mon;1Oring of
I
I
roanagerial decis ,ons, Michael Jen~ states the followmg m hIS Presidential Address to the
American Financial Association '0 199) (Jensen. 1'i9):
Boards should have an 'mplieit undersmndmg or exphcll requncmem tha i new
members must invest in the stock of the company. While the lmhal m\'estmcm
could vary. It should seldom be less than $100,000 fj-om the new board
member' s personal f"nds, this investment would force new board members to
rceogIllzc from the outset that their deCISions affect their own wealth as well as
that of remote Shareholders. Over the long term the mwstment ean be made
much largcr by options or stock·based , ompens.allon, 'me [eC~."t trend to pay
some board member fees In stock or opno", is a move In lhe right dire,tlon,
Discouraging board members Irom "' llmg IhlS equny IS Important SO that
holdings will .ccumulate to a significant Sl2C over lime,
The main element of the dirc<:tor pay plan advocated by Jensen IS thaI a subSllont,,1
amount of a director ' s wealth is pUt at risk. Jensen argues that newly ap[l<llllted d" octors ~hould
Inve~t a minimum of $100.000 on equity usi"g ~rSQ"1l1 flmds. In addition, compJIlIes ~hould
onable directors to build on this initial equity investment by compensat ing them with eqully -
based mstrumcnts in lieo of the usual annual cosh retainer. These sequential aelions w,11
encourage dim:tors to aecumulatc significant cquil}' over t ime and generate 'ownership
eX[l<lsure. However. dlreetors eJn ~ountera~t and reduce ownership exposure by IiquidJtll1g
thetr equity [l<lw ;ons Directors Can also u:;c financial derivatives such as (put) "p tion., as risk
management touls to rcduce th<:lr ",,"ership cxpos ure, Therefore, a key deSign feature of an
etTcetlw di" e(or mccntlvc plsn is the imposition of rcstrictions on salt of the equity mstruments
awarde<!. Furth, rm,x c. directors should also be constrained from using financlal dem" tlws to
reduce their o,,"erShlp expos ure,
With these sequential and , omplemcntary steps. dircctor compensauon can be an
effective teet to align the interests of di...,<: tors and shareholdcrs. Thc Nalional Association of
Corporate Directors (NACO. 1995) supports thIS poSition , In the 1995 BI",~ Ribbrm Commission
Report Oil Direclor Cumpe"'iI1liOll. the NACD prup<1ses "boards should pJY direl'lors solely in
th, form of stock and cash on with «J uity represennng a substanl1 JI portion of the lolal up to
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1000/. " Whilc Jenscn defincs an initial Icvel holding of at Icast St00,000, the NACD suggests
an eventual target of $600,000 for directors of l arg~ companL~S.
The idca of providing dil"<'ctors WIth eqully-based incetllives SQ that they can allam a
nK'anmgful IFel of o"''tlership cxlXlSurC has ~alncd widesprcad acceptancc in thc US
Sharcholder interes t groups m pameular tend to concur with th,s prcsenption. Two mflucnnal
pension funds, T1AA-eREF and Califomia Publie Employces ' R~t i rel ne nt System (CAL-PERS),
support the idea that di rectors ShOllld maintain a minimllm own~rsh ip I~vel in the company' s
stock (Koppes, 1996), For instance. CALPERS advocates that at least 50% of the director ' s tota l
compen,ation should be '" company Stock..
Ca""" 1 Emptor: Boes h'ccnth'c r a}' fo r l)irectors I' ro" ide Incem;'·cs': Or Is It Pa ~'orr:
DirtttOT pay eonlain s inccntlVes Ir the amount or the COmpensallOn ;s strOllgly linked to
finn pcrfonnance and if th<:re is a substantial petlalty for pom nrm !X'rfonnan ce. If thi, were the
case , drrccrors art motivated to increase ti rm ..aluc. The downside or penalty is Bermcal featllre
of an mcent;-'e conlr.lel. This IS thc reaSOn why Jensl'n and others stress that plans should put
director wealth at risk and generJ.teo \\nership exposure.
On the othcr hand, d,rector pay can provide ~on,idcra bl c eompc'nsation lu directors c"en
if nrm performance IS weak. A pavolI plan can arise when sufficient !>Cnalties for P:Q:Ql:
!K"rform;mce 00 nol ex lSl and/or whcn a dlfc~ lQI is nol rC<l uiti:d 10 rnam1ain owp ~rffii p CX !l()wre,
An example of a plan wuh an insuffiCient penalty" one where stock opnons With an exercise
price close to zero arc gi"en to d,rectors tn this casc, the eom!X'nsatlon obtained rrom stock
oplLons will alnmst always be positiw , and thc dLreetors will be nposed to no dou-ns,dc, Thu s,
there arc substantial rewa rds ewn for poor pcrforrnan~e . PayolT plans can also be plans that
provide directors Subslantla l fiex,b,ltly to reduce thclf ownership expos"re. For Lnstance, when
shares wnh w ry short vtstmlr pcn oJ s (I.e" the period in which shares cannot be sold) are gIVen
to dm,etor:s, the directors can qULckly cash Ollt of their posrnon s. Such plnns arc counter·
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productive because once directo rs have cashed oUl the mcenllves nO longer exist. It 's
quest ionabk whether a payoff plan can benefil shareholders.
Graef S. CrysllIl. a noted author on CEO compensanon. weIghed in On thIs subJcct. In a
\99 1 Fortu ne amclc (Cryst al, 1991). Cryslal questions' "0 0 directors cam lheir kcep?"
Analyzmg a sample of 104 large" Fortune SUO and Sen 'lce 500 compames, Cryslal found thai
finns do not use slock option grants 10 o' ....eOm" an under..;;ompct'livc k "d of eompensa tlon for
the,r directors . Rather, lhey added lhese stock-based comp<mcnts on top of already compet itive
le ~els of compcnsalion resulting m an ine,"ase in 101.1 director wmpensation, While this
ob""'rvation may be dated. it is consisrer u wllh lhe more recent lrend reponed by Investor
Responsibility Research Ccntcr (Bertsch. 1998). Stud}'ing the Standard & Poor's Super 500
firms in 1997, the IRRC report suggests that directors' annual cash wmpensation has been
essenn.lIy stabl.- for lhe last several years, The number and size of supplemc'nllli stock and
opuon awards . howc""r. have skyrocketed, lcading to subSlantial increase' m lhe aggregate level
of director compensalion. Are the'" incrcases in drrcctcr compensation Justified? Or are they
merely addilional "perks" to directors?
OpoosjtlOn 10 jncen uw pay for ~1rc<:lQrS, "'hilt sroradic to Ill<: US. apocar} to be
"ld,.pread lO other tynsdICllon>. npc~lal\y ,n thf Unned Kingdom In a report eomn11S,ion~l! by
lhe Secretary of State for Trade and Induslry and the Chancellor of the Exchequer of lhe United
Ktngdom, Derek lli ggs advocates the u,c of fees and discourages thc use of sharcs and opuons
(Higgs, 2(03). In panicular. Higgs rccommend, thaI in addition to specify ing the ccnditions for
exercise. the shares thus oblamcd should be held unhl one year aflcr thc non-exeeut,,·c director
lea"es the board. This recommendation ,s ba,~d on ,"formation oblained from a , un 'ey of UK
directors and chalmlcn .
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Once a finn decides to offer HKenti\'e pay to its d"~to's. n has to design an effec!tve
package that o tters tncenuve s. Ilow can firms !.>est Implement mcent lve pay for directors? In the
following discussion, we idenlify key ;mplemenlallOn Issue.' concernmg the pJramctcrs of the
compensJtion package. In general. these i ssu~s pen . in to tile form of th~ .ward. the pre·
ct>nditions for the award and the restn ctions Imposcd on the .ward~es
l$.ru e #1: Opl;O" .'· or !iroch-?
TIle kev to offerm g inc( ntiycs Iii to incr( .w a dirccwr's ownership exposu rc hy
mcluding ~quity-baiied comooncnts 10 thc comlx:mallOn pacbgc, Two main ways ,n which
finn s (lffer ;neenll ves are aw.rd, of iihar~s , nd stock opllons. In both cases. fi rms should try 10
restrict the cash cut proc~ss. In Ih~ , ' ii~ (If restrloled shares. dlfeolors can oc prohibited rrom
se lling tl,e shares before a eel1ain d. le, " hioh ma)- Of m3Y n(ll be relaled to thc dir..><:IOr's tcnurc.
In the oa"" of 5Iock oplions. firm can reslnct resale and constram option e.~ercisc by stipul.tlng a
long "eslI ng period.
Options and restricted shareii differ Ln Ihe" sensitIvity to firm pcrformllnce and hence In
their nsk levels. Restric ted sh.res offer . lower risk .nd reward pro file th. n opllons. WhIle
option ,-.Iues Can reaeh zero, shares are r. rely worthkw 11,u<, restricted sh.res often provide
grealer value to dircctor< th.n oplions when jinn perfonnance decl ine, . In th" context,
restric ted sh.res .rc Ie." risky . lld provide greater reword to the d trc><:lors.
Stock options are more commonly U3ed In Incentive contrnclS . Their attrac tweness hes
In thclr Iew rage and the "bi lity to selcct thcrr exercise priec. I'i'st. options are I~veraged
Instrum~-n l s. Opt, on values can increase dramJtlc.l ly In percent.ge t~l11lS wh~n the underlying
asset increases in value Thus d,,~etors are glv~n the opportunity tQ Increase theIr wealth
dram' lIe. lly by working to ,nae.", share prices. Second, Smce opllons arc granted wIth . fixed
~xe1\: i "" pr ie~, th~y offer the .d,,,ntage of downside risk if firm value docs not achieve a certain
threshold. If the share price is below the excrcI'" pnce, the optIOn is nCI valu.ble, ConSider a
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finn that oft"rs lis dire ctors options m heu of a portlOn of the retainer. Here. the consequence of
poor performance would be a lower than usual remuneration. Thus, by sett ing appropria te leveh
of the exerd se pnee. fimlS can proVIde thdr directors with powerful Incenllves .
Iss"e #2: r" Gil'e '''cem;,·c,' If." If BI)"".' l)r Nm?
WaITen Suffcn. m hi. 1994 annual letter to shareholders of Serh lm e HJ1h,,',ay Inc"
"'ntes "' Ironically, the rhetoric about options frequently descr ibes them as desi",blc because they
put mana!.'Crs and owners in the same fmanclal boat. In reality. the boats arc far different. No
owner has ever escaped the burden of capita l costs, whereas a holder of a fixed-price option
bears no capital costs at all , An owner muSt weIgh upside potent ial agaInst downside nsk; an
option holder has no do"midc (Cunningham, 20(1)," Implicil in Bilftet' s crit icism is tho fact
that managers do not bear eapnal costs lx.'<:a usc they arc gl"en options (or sharn ) wnho ut
reqUiring a monetary .acnfiee, The same critICIsm also applies to proVIdingdlrc-<;tors WIth shares
or options . To allevlale lh,s concern, finns should Impose capital costs by reqlllnng dIrector. to
purchase these mstrumcnts with thelr personal funds, Alternatively, finns can also encoumge
directors to "'bUY" eq uity_ba ...d incenllves by g,,~ng up a portIon of their casb retamer. That " .
f,nns call pay dlrcclors wllh lI1CenllVes Ln !reu of thc annual cash retainer. By taking these actio",
firms can prevent the" dire ctor lncent" .., comp,:nsatlon from assumIng a bonus-like form.
Howe'-er, there is another con"derallon thai argues for a bonus-like structure for d,reclOr
mcentivc compensation. Like manager)al compensallon. dll"tC19r eOJTll)(:n satjon can
slmuliaru:ously contam both incentl"e and reward components Wh,le ineenti"c components
compensate d"c-ctors for fUlure pcrfomlance. ,""ward components compensale directors for past
perfonnance. The bla"kct proviSlOn of OpILO", and restricted shares, ' lTC SpcCtlve of pasl
pcrforma" ce proVIde IllcennveS lO Improve fUlure performance but do not reward dlrc<:tor ror
past perfonnance achievement , Arb'\lably. a reward component in the compensatIOn package
may provide equally Imponant alrgnmcnl of director incentives for two reasons. First. the
s
reward may seC','e as a periodic Slgnalmg or feedback IlIechamsm to re,nforee desirable
performance behavior and thus elicit higher levels of such behavior leading to improved futurc
perfOMnance (Luthans , 1999) ~econd , by prov Ldmg addl1lOnal shares or opuons for pa>.!
performance, the leve l of mcentl"" also rises Thus, there is an imphcll eorrela llon between the
reward and meenUve components
Reward compo nents can be hU11t Imo the compensatIon package by vary ing thc conditIon
m whIch LIlcenm'e awards are granted. For mstance. the awards of opnons Or shares could be
eonungent on metncs Ihat relate to past performance such as (3) I'nor year stock pnce
performance (b) Pnor year Earnmgs per Share (EI'S) (c) Prior year Return on Equl1y (ROE) and
(d) Pnor year cash flow metrics such as Earnings Before Interes!. Taxes. DepreclJtion and
Amol1ization (EBr r DA). Since a reward component pays directors for past performa nce, such a
component would generally nOi require a tradeoff m the cash rel. iner. In thIS comext, d"ector
compensation can take the fla\'or ofa bonus:
/ ."$/le #J : Setll C/<?Il' Object;I'c ofAIII,;n;"1f Il S;gIJ iji cotlt Le"c/ ofO"'/la.,lJip
Incemive compensation for d,reotors " . lfUeturally dlfferem from that for managers,
Managellle nt compensation IS scI at hIgh lncls In the absolute as well as relative senSe. Annual
mcollle for 3 manage r IS lypically a Slgnlfi cant fmcm", of hIS we.lth. In comrast, " trC\: tor
compensauon is reblL"e ly modest. Most Jm:c!Ors arc either retired Orre tIring s.:n ior ex<cutl\'' '
from large publIC compame. (Fern•. fOl1hcommg). Bocau>e of theIr work hIstory, these duec to,S
arC likely to have accumu lated a slgmfl<anl k,'c! "f wealth. Also, eorporale " ircetors Can
diver5\fy their mcome sITeam by servmg on mulup le boar"s, Thus, a "i reetor's eompe" s.tion
from . pal1icul.r ftrm is neither a brge portion of hIS overall wealth nOr is it a large fraction of
his overall income.
For these reasons, it is especi.lIy import.nt to p.y heed to the re<:ommendal;ons of
Jensen and Ihc NACD an" ".Slgn contracts that w jl] >erve to .ccumulate S1gnLfic.m equity
I
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posn,ons o\' er time Cnn:;equently, veslIng period' and restrictions on the ... Ie of equny are
Important components of the compensation plan.
-uesr Practices" for I)esigning l) ireclO r Inccm" 'e Pal'
Based On the above d ':;l:USS Lon . we can summanze the beSt pn~ctiecs governing the
dcsl!,'ll of an mccnnvc contrac t for directors a:;; follows '
1. An effective plan should provide a majority of lhe pay wnh eqmty-ba'ed
in:;;trurnents such as stocks and sloc l opllons. Bm ineent",c compcn!illtlon 10
directors should nOi he u, ed as an excuse to increase ["tal compensatIon
substantially and unconditIOnally. At least $Orne poninn of the incentive pay should
be in licu Of lh,' cash retainer,
2, Thc goal of prOVIding stock related eompensalton should be 10 accumulate
~ ubstanl ia l "'l uny exposure. WhIle this Can be achic"cd SImply by reqUiring
dtreelOrs tn mvest the" eXlSlLng weallh m company ,hares, a more pract,cal
alternative is 10 ensure that (aJ annual award s of ,hares nr nptinns arc , ubstantlal and
(bJ dirc"Clor;; are prohlb,ted from reducmg thClr cxposure by selling the" shares.
3 , Inctnllve eompcnsollon should crcalC inccntives for fUlure pcrfom>ance
enhanecmem as wcll as prOVIde reInforcement for past performance aehie,·emen!.
To ach,evc rbcsc purposes. firms should var)" lhe amount of lhe grant based no
current Or past performance 00 as to link mccntive awards to paSl perfom'anee
aeh ie,."ment.
Are ·'Ues t Practic es" Followed?
We now repon on 289 dtrector mccOli,'c contracts adopted durm8 1988 _1998. Our data
arc derived from Gerety (200 I), who study stock price "'actinns 10 the adoptIon of dtrt:ctor
mccntivc plans. The sample covers 11 years and repr.sents lhe intlial c.~p<:ricnce of firms that
providc ineenti,·c pay l'or directors. \\,'e focus on two important aspecls of these plans; the nature
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of the equity-based mstrument used and whet her the mccntrve is gravy_like on that It does not
rcqurrc tradeoff o f an existing retainer. We ident ify plans that solely use op tions. restricted
shar es or (unrestneted) stoc k awards and find that the majonty of the plans (152 of 289) use
solely op tions r"r the Incentive compone nt. Th e typ,cal oplioo plan entails an annual grant of
opt,ons on 1.000 shares w,th an exercise price equal to the preva ,ling share pnce: tbe "est ing
period is typic ally 0-4 years: the maturny is typically 10 year< The number of restncled shares
and stock award plans are 4? and J I respect " 'e1y
TAKEINTABLE J
We also rcpon on thc number of grJ"}' p lans, Wc lind that moSt plans 1222 QUt o f 289)
providc incentive awa rds as ··...ravy'· in add ilion 10 nist in... cash eompc n:>a tion, In these plans,
the directors are n01 required to give up any of lheir current pay to receive the incco1i,'c awards .
As we have discussed previously, dir~tor com pensat ion can lake on a "bonliS" tlavc r if Incentive
a"'ards are cont ingent on ach LC\'cmcnt of paSt pcrfonnance goals . Howc"cr , wc lind Ihat almost
nonc of these plans tlnk lhe a"'a rd, to pasl liml perfonnancc. Th us, we ca ll these gra"y plans ,
Earli er, we had note d that Ihc le'-ct of dlrcctor co mpensauon has risen ," reCent t,me, . Clcurly,
these gravy plans h"vc con1ribut e<.! to this mereaSi:.
The above issues are best hlghloghted by two exa mples; GE and Handy & Hannan. The
1989 GE plan emly satisfies $Orne of thc requirements for an effective paehge, The
shon comm gs of the GE ptan are as folio"". I'm;t. the siock opllon component co" cring 1,500
share>does nol dommale the annual eash rela iner and meeting fees . In fact, the optlon grant IS
made "'ithout any reductIOn in the CX1Stlllg dircctor cOmpensatIOn , Th us, even if the opt,ons are
worthless, dircctors wou ld benc lit sub stan lially from the olhcr cash compone ntl of lhe
compensatIOn package, Second. the vesting schedule for the OptiOnS >s inadequate on that " faits
to erea te a long-term exposu re to corporate equIty holding, TI,c GE plan allows directors to
exercise Op!IOn grants 1Il four equa l armualmstallments and once the opHons are exe rclsed . there
are no further restrictions on the sale of stock, A director who wishes to mmirmze h,s exposure
to GE equity cao exercISe whene"er possible and lITlInediatdy sell the shares obtained , We
calculate that, at the mmmmm, thlS suategy w1l l expose the director to no more tha" ),750 shares
In the option contract.
The 1990 Handy & liannan plan IS pamcularly egregious and lade n w,th gravy . Th"
plan offers options with a "" tional value of $12,000 ,,'hile maint"ininll Ihe director's cash
relam,1' of S24JlOO. The plan Irn,refore mcreases dIrector eompcnsahon by 50%. Further. the
opt,ons carry a low e;<ere;se price of $1 comparod to Ihe stock price of S13.50. Thus. these
optIOns ha"c "" intd nsic value (I.e., the "aluc if exerclScd today) of approxlrnatdy 50% ot" the
annual retainer. The fact that these options arc ,,,,Iuable m almosl all circumstances, unless the
Slock price drops to belo w a dollar, .hould be a poor Slgnal to shareho lders and ,n' llIUlional
m\'cstors.
In lil;ht of this evide"ce. a vahd qucsHon lS whelhcr dIrector effort and performa nce has
correspo ndingly increased In recent ycar,. Given that the vast majority of firms use incenrtve
compens.uion as all addition to director ca, h compensatlon, one would hope 10 observe that
d irector perfommncc has illcreascd. Otherwise. the label 'g mvy' remains dcscript ,ve and
accurate. One oositl"" de, domTh:1I1 " that the numher of gravy plans IS dcereasmg 10 reccnt
~ For cxamp le, if onCcons,dcrs the most recent 4 years, 1995-1998, one obse" 'es a slightly
lower incidence of gra"y plans (72 .4% or 89 of 123) than m the flf" 4 ycar period . 1988-1991
(857% or72of &4) ,
What uoes tile futu n hold'!
The move to offcnng lneerlh"C pay 10 directors is well under way and irreversible. All
the ,mportant eonShtucntSmacademtctans, busmess leaders. managers . "'veSlors and portfoho
managers-c-are supponive of thiS mov'ement , We nOlc that the first pan of this rcvoluuon is now
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comp lcte with a vast majonty of US firms now having an onc~ntive plan m place . The pace of
incent ive plan adoptions has been quite rnpid, with most of the adoptIons occurri ng on the 19905.
Our 'tudy of the firl l generation mceml\"l; plan. for dlRy tOrs md,cates lhal most plan,
are f1aw~d They are ~xces<lvely bonus -like and provide rewards ~vcn for poor pcr fonnance.
They have served to me-case director compensa tion SIgnIficantly . An lrnpamal observer IS left
wondering whether the obj~ct of tho ~xoroi,e is to mcreas~ d,,""tor payor to increasc mcenhv~
alignment betw~~n d,,~otors and ,har~holdcr,. Influemla l ent ies of manag~"a l compensatIon,
such as Gra~f CI)·sta1. have now start~d paying attention to tho ~qua l ly Imponant i$Sue of
d,rector compensation.
We do, however. note some positive trends in lh~ design of these cotltraet'_ We note a
sman but not~wortby convergence toward the ,deal contract. Mor~ and mor~ firms ar~ r~qui"ng
dir~clOrs tn make monetary sacrif.c~s to rece Ive valuable ~qu ity-bas~d instrurn~ntS sucb as
OptiOns. Some f,nns are e'-en makmg awards condll1onal on prIOr performance. Also. there tS an
mcreasing sensitivity toward the n~~d to mcreas~ share own~rshlp of d"eClor~ Qve r tim~ by
Impostng constraints on the IiqutdatlOn of lhe equity instruments. Fioally, In a di r~ct rtsrons~ to
Jensen' s ca ll, we are see ing firms dramat ically increase the proportion of cquit}-bascd
compensation to overall director compensamm: thIS IS ~spec ial1y true for technology finns such
as D~H and Yahoo where the proportion is close to l OO"A Our a ss~ss"",m IS that th~ s~cond pan
of the revolution is und~r way but has quite a way to go before ItS completion.
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T oh le 1
I' lon C ha r acttr istics By Yea r of Proposa l, 1988-1998
Charaoterlstics for 289 ~q u L1y-based compensa tIon pions fOf non-executlvc directors. Deferred
compensation plans are nOl consid..~d 10 b<' mcent",,, compensa llOn plans. A gravy plan IS a
plan Ihat provIdes dLrectors with addmonal equity-based compl.'nS<lllOn wrtbcut requinng tmdeotT
10 annual reta;ncr. Opuon plan' arc plans thai 1O,-olvc the uSC of optIons, A rnajonry (143) of
the 152 opt Ion plans provides dneetors wilh pen<xhc annual awards of stock options ralher than
a one·t; me award. A restricted share plan mdLcatl's either a f"mal restric ted stock plan or an
incent ive plan involving the use of resale-restricted shares , Stock a"'"ard plans are plans that
Irtvolvc the use of eommon sloch . t>lL~ed plans have both opnon amI shan:: components.
DiSl dil ut ion by Types of 1" cenlive Award Distribution nf Gra"y
Plans
SlOck
Year a! TO/al Optio" Restricted A ward Mt,,:d Gra;y Nan .(iravy
Pro osal Number 1'10" Share 1'1011 Plan Plan Plall no»
1988_1991 " 58 13
, 9 n "
1992_1994 8' " 00 9 11 Gl "
19" 5- 1998 123 sa " 18 sr 80 "
Ove,'all 089 152 '" n " m 67
I
I
The DCI;ig l1 of II1 <:el1 ti , 'e Com pens at io l1 for Di reClO rs
Exe cut ive Sum ma ry
In 1989, the board of General Electric Corporati<;111 (GEl vOled I" "ffer stock "pitons to
liS non-.:xccutLW dLrectors. GE was in tlK: vanguard of the move 10 otter equity-based incentIve
compensation to directors. Today. we find that most large US firms havc Ionc wed GE's lead
We e.~p1am this phrnom enon by summarizing arguments frrun academicians and praCl iuoners.
The most eloquent prollOnet\t for incentLw pay IS MIchael Jensen who argues for
substantial (>SI OO.OOO) ownership exposure by directors and for such own ership to rise over
tllrn:. Addition.lly. Jensen calls for at least part of this own ership to be paid using the personal
funds of d,rcctors. Such a conceptual framework for director pay also linds supports hum the
Nahonal Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).
Although the prevailing , \,ltwentional wisdom is strongly sUPpo"ivc, thc," is a "alid
concern that firms 100 often des'gIl these eompcnsatlOn arrangements ineffectively. provldmg
'payoffs' to the directors that would increase their compensation regardless of fmn performance,
n us has led noted ,nn,s of uecutlv" , 0mpt'l1,atTOn soch as Graef Crystal to focus On dlreetor
compensation and qll"st;on II' h"thcr directo rs are "aming th" it 'kccp' ,
We tdcntdy three Important Issues regardIng the dCSLgn of dire, tor tn,ent""C
compensation arrangements. First. tinn~ need 10 decide on II'hether 10 use options or shares_We
show thal the risk·rcward profIle dIffer. ror thcse twO altemat;"cs lIIld that options olTer a more
S'-'TI, ;ti"e profIle. Options also allow deSIgn flexibllny in thal th, excrcise pn, c can be tailored to
n eate an optimal amount of tn, ent,,·es. Second. finns need to detcrmme the proportion of the
compensation attributable to past perfonnanee (b<.>nus eompon"n\) and the proport ion attrib utable
to future pcrfonnanee (ineentive ,omponent), Superfielally it might appear ", though the lalter
must dominate, but there is a case 10 be made for a bonus component: for example. f,nns may
vary the n" mber of share, or options to relleet past performance. Third. and perhaps most
importamly, firn,s shou ld constraIn and prevent directors from reducing their o""ersh,p
exposure. Thil can be achlevw by using 10tlger ,'estmg periods or by speclfymg nnmrnum levels
of exposure: additIonally. firms should P'OhLbll directors from USLng financIal derlvatw es to
decrease lheir o""ersh;p eXjlOSure
Finally, we analyLe 289 ;nSlances of ftnns offerLng incenn>'c pay 10 dnectors 10
understa nd whether aClual pmclice conforms 10 the general prine' pies Identified above , We foc us
on three importan t aspects of these plans, the usc of options v.... shares. whether the eqully award
reqUlres giving up a part of the existin g rctemer and whether the amount oflhe award depends on
past performance , We rmd that lhe maJ0rlly of the plans (1 52 o£189) usc only oplLons. We also
report on the numt>l:r of gravy plans where ",e etl1 i"e awards are ladled on top of the usual
' elamer, We find lhal a supe,·maJorlly of the plans (122 out of289) fit lhlS category , Fmally.
we find thai almost none of these plans link the awards 10 past IIrm performance.
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